Three years after its creation, the Southeast European Stability Pact is now reframing its strategy. Since 1999, when 28 states and a number of international organizations pledged their commitment and active support for the stabilization and democratization of Southeast Europe, the Stability Pact has faced both criticism and recognition from the participants. However, as over 80 per cent of the projects listed in Working Table I (Democracy and Human Rights) are currently running, the question remains whether a new round of projects will be put up for funding and how this will be achieved, as many voices from the civil society have accused it of a lack of transparency and of coherent strategy.

At the office of the Special Envoy of the SEE Stability Pact Coordinator, set up in Bucharest early this year, we found out about the efforts undertaken by the Stability Pact officials in incorporating not only the experience and the feed-back from the Quick Start Package (the first package of projects proposed for funding), but also in building a network among the National Coordinators, participant countries, executive bodies, international organizations and donors and, of course, Brussels, in order to enhance communication and efficiency towards a better approach in the region.

Relying upon a team of six, the Special Envoy's office has attracted a pool of experts in various fields that aim to lend their support to the projects deemed as most important. The Special Envoy himself, Mr. Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu, a young and active diplomat, told us more about the tasks of his office and about the development and future of Working Table I, a topic widely discussed during the second Regional Conference of the Stability Pact that took place in Bucharest on 25 and 26 October 2001.

Central European Review: In May 2001, the office of the Special Envoy of the SEE Stability Pact Coordinator was officially opened in Bucharest. Could you tell us what this position implies in term of responsibilities?

Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu: In just a couple of words, it's very much about coordinating the efforts of the national coordinators of the beneficiary countries in Southeast Europe in their endeavor to get in touch with, and establish a connection to, other international bodies or with the European Commission. On the other hand, it is an office which provides a sort of a "translation service" on behalf of Brussels to the beneficiary countries in the area, so that intentions, projects and initiatives coming from the Stability Pact area, and from the Commission, and from important donors and partners would be better understood and put into practice in Southeast Europe.

The office represents the [Stability Pact] Coordinator, trying to convey his message to national coordinators and government executive bodies in the area. It is more of an "embassy" of the Stability Pact [...] We also do our own analyses of the economic, politic, social or strategic military situation on behalf of the countries in the region. We have our own initiatives and are also bound to focus our initiatives on projects that Brussels tries to either boost or set up.

With the recent developments following the September 11 attacks in the US, the international community is now shifting its focus towards another region and another issue: terrorism. Not only its attention, but also its resources and its active support. How will this affect the Working Table I priorities? Will there be any changes in its substance?

The projects encompassed by the WT I will not be affected by what happened at the beginning of September in New York. The importance of projects listed in the Working Table III [Security—ed] will be enhanced. So far, there are lots of projects dealing with organized crime or corruption, initiatives like SPOC/SPAI [The Stability Pact Initiative against Organised Crime/The Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative—ed], SECI [The Southeast European Cooperative Initiative—ed]. These three elements, organized crime, corruption and illegal trafficking of people and goods, are connected to terrorism; terrorism cannot survive without them. The regional conference will have to prove more commitment to supporting and funding whatever projects will fall under these circumstances.

Does it mean that these concerns might affect other problems the region is facing, but which are not directly connected to terrorism?

This is a question we have to always find an answer to. Whatever happened in the US has so far affected the entire world. There is a problem with the political mechanisms such as the Stability Pact and there is a tiny chance [they will] loose the attention of, or loose track in, Brussels or Washington, but that will not happen. On the contrary, the Stability Pact as an agency for preventing conflicts looks far more interesting from this point of view, because it could add a component of conflict prevention and demonstrate where the interest may lay ahead, as unprecedented policies [of this kind] had been enacted by actors in the region. Those initiatives fighting for stability or trying to build up regional security are most important from the conflict-prevention perspective, as this is the role of the Stability Pact. And secondly, there is no reason to drive the attention of the international community away from the problems in the area and to concentrate on the problem of terrorism only. It would be absolutely illogical. [...]

In October 2000, a Charter on the partnership between NGOs and governments in the region was adopted. Among other things, the Charter stated the commitment of the participating states to support regional NGO initiatives and to foster the development of an active and responsible civil society. Now, one year after its adoption, what are the outcomes of this charter?

The Charter was a warrant of the good will of governments in the area, focusing on the respect for democracy and human rights. The NGO Charter has underlined the will of both executive bodies, elected parliaments, on the one hand and, on the other hand, of civil society representatives to change the domestic political environment in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it showed the lines of conduct for governments, for elected bodies and, politically, for representatives of the civil society to fill the gap resulted from the totalitarian Milošević regime.

One of the results, for example, was to let people understand in Belgrade that there is a real need to politically get in touch, to stay in touch with democratic NGOs or with NGOs promoting democracy. NGOs were heavily criticized under the Milošević regime and this was one of the most important outcomes. [...] There was a sort of political basis and a political reasoning to it. And it so happened that the same situation, although in a different political environment, could be seen in countries like Albania, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or Bosnia and Hercegovina, where the distances, the communication between representatives of civil society and the executive bodies was either interrupted, or very scarce.

The NGO Charter was preceded by a Media Charter, which somehow helped to make the authorities understand the significance and the role of the media in a democratic society. That would be another important outcome of the Stability Pact. I am very proud to say that this was a Romanian initiative and the most important achievement at the time (and for a long time [afterwards]), gathering at least acknowledgment, if not commitment.

Again, the NGO Charter, as well as the Media Charter, were useful in different political environments, such as the Republic of Moldova, where the democratic society is undergoing a delicate process of formation, while the opposition and [forms of] civil criticism are in danger [...], offering [democratic forces] the opportunity to say that they are backed by the general opinion of the countries in SEE. [These charters] are mechanisms to exercise pressure on the executive bodies in Moldavia to build respect toward the civil society and media, so the first step prior to its full membership in the Stability Pact was to come closer to these lines of conduct, as put forward by these two charters.

Last but not least, there has also been a sudden shift of interest of the NGOs into the projects put under the aegis of the WT I. This NGO Charter gave a sort of a new impulse to NGOs to come forward and build projects either with their governments or collateral to their governments. The NGOs' communication with executive bodies got better.

Is there going to be a second Quick Start Package?

Yes and no. The short answer is yes. The long answer would be "not exactly," because we have understood that most of our forces have been dissipated in different initiatives, some of which never reached an end. And for this basic reason, none of the donors would be happy to spend their money on projects that could be all encompassing or have no consequences. And this is the reason why, in June 2001, at the Regional Table meeting in Brussels, countries and donors have adopted a document called the Strategic Framework and Key Priorities which specifies quite clearly what fields should be addressed. It means that funds would be allotted for some clear domains: media, education, inter-ethnic relations etc. This framework is a document coming from a united effort of the Stability Pact. It's a sort of an outline for the new strategy, it means that neither the donors nor the beneficiaries like to endure failures, but would rather concentrate on these fields.

Some voices in the civil society from the region criticized the lack of transparency in the selection and funding criteria used for the Quick Start Package, accusing that the projects currently funded are actually putting the money back into Western pockets. How would you respond to these accusations?

I would only like to say that such kind of criticism usually stems from frustrations, and the Stability Pact doesn't deal with these frustrations. The Stability Pact is not a social venue, [does not function on the principle of] "come and get your money." It is [about] who needs the money and what exactly is the money going to be spent for? It is a sort of an indebtment agency, and much more than projects and donors. As far as money going back to Western pockets is concerned, I would be a bit reluctant to say that, considering how many NGOs' projects in the area have reached their ends. I wonder whether that money has been spent for the benefit of the Western countries or for the benefit of this region, and definitely the latter is what I would opt for.

Even though the Regional Envoy Office has only been set a couple of months ago, what are its most important achievements so far?

Actually, this office points out the importance that the Stability Pact has gathered in terms of political consequences in the eyes of the international community. It also shows that Brussels intends to look at the area through a magnifying glass, through the people from the area and in respect to issues that matter to people from the area. [...]

There are lots of achievements. We have set up regional projects such as the rehabilitation of the Euroregions, a project included under the umbrella of Euro-regional initiatives. We have actively taken part in organizing the Business Advisory Council meeting in Bucharest. We also called upon national coordinators and we have set for the first time a mechanism of informal meetings, so that they speak at least the same "language" and know more about each other. We have attracted lots of attention to Bucharest, as we have accepted for this office to be here, we scored positive points for Romania within the Stability Pact, as one of the most important countries in the area and by far the most important beneficiary considering its demographic size and geo-political importance.

Delia Despina Dumitrica, 5 November 2001

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